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The Blind Arhat and the Old Baby:
Liberation by Wisdom,
the Dry-Insight Practitioner, and the
Pairing of Calm and Insight
David V. Fiordalis ∗
Introduction: Charting
Dichotomies

a

Path

through

the

Manifold

In a series of articles published nearly a century ago, Louis
de La Vallée Poussin (1929, 1937a, 1937b) drew attention to what he
considered to be two distinct and opposing “tendencies” or
“theories” in classical Buddhism about how to achieve the ultimate
goal of the path, one primarily through an “intellectual” or
“rational” apprehension of a certain body of truths, and the other
through “ascetic” or what he also called “ecstatic” or “mystical”
practices. He sketched the former broadly as including an emphasis
on “wisdom” (P: paññå; Skt: prajñå), “insight” (vipassanå/
vipaßyanå), “seeing the truths” (satyadarßana), and “application of
the Dhamma” (dhammayoga). The latter he saw as emphasizing
“concentration” (samådhi), “calm abiding” (samatha/ßamatha),
“absorption” (jhåna/dhyåna), “meditative attainment” (samåpatti),
“extraordinary knowledge and powers” (abhiññå/abhijñå), and
other “meditative” achievements. In this way, he sought to map a
general dichotomy onto classical Buddhism. He also thought this
basic dichotomy manifested itself in a number of different tensions
that he saw as dividing the Buddhist tradition, mainly between
(theoretical or textual or rational or intellectual) study (or insight)
and practice (mainly of meditation, but also asceticism). He
∗

Linfield College, Oregon, USA. Email: fiordalisi75@gmail.com

22

The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 20, 2019

surmised that these tendencies or theories also represented opposing
conceptions of the ultimate goal itself, and that perhaps they even
led to the development of rival factions or “schools” within the
Buddhist tradition, and he drew a number of other conclusions Luis
Gómez (1999 : 693) has described as “unsubstantiated” and “at best
questionable.”
In many ways, the distinction between calm (ßamatha) and
insight (vipaßyanå) has shaped contemporary descriptions of (and
prescriptions for) Buddhist practice, including meditation practice,
and the ostensibly related dichotomies continue to influence
modern scholarly understandings of Buddhist doctrine, theory, and
history. For example, building on La Vallée Poussin (1937a) and
even including a translation into English of the first few paragraphs
of his essay, Richard Gombrich (1996 : 96) published an article
exploring what he calls “the idea that Enlightenment can be
attained without meditation, by a process of intellectual analysis
(technically known as paññå, insight) alone.” But is it really
accurate to say that any Buddhists have maintained at any time that
“Enlightenment can be attained without meditation”? Is this what
the Påli Buddhist sources mean by “liberation through wisdom”
(paññåvimutti)? For one practitioner’s viewpoint, albeit
representing a different Buddhist tradition from the one mainly
discussed by Gombrich, no less significant a contemporary
Buddhist voice than the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (1994: 114),
says at the start of his brief comments on the ninth chapter of the
Bodhicaryåvatåra (on prajñå): “In order to realize emptiness, we
do not actually need the first five påramitås, and they are not even
essential for developing clear insight for vipashyanå.” Now, the
Dalai Lama does not explicitly say here that “Enlightenment can be
attained without meditation,” but he does suggest that one need not
perfect the virtue of meditation (or the other perfect virtues) in
order to “develop clear insight” or “realize emptiness.” What does
this mean?
It seems that the nature of the distinction between calm and
insight, how these concepts relate to one other, the broader
implications of this distinction for Buddhist understandings of
meditation and its place on the path, and how this distinction
relates to other paired concepts that have been connected to it, such
as the theory/practice dichotomy, the dichotomy between textual
study and meditation practice, the dichotomy between “forest
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monk” (the virtuoso ascetic) and the “town monk” (the ordinary
ritualist),1 and other dichotomies: all these remain open questions
that continue to interest both scholars and practitioners alike. The
list of scholars to follow in La Vallée Poussin’s footsteps is long
and includes many prominent voices in the history of Buddhist and
Indian Studies.2 Some scholars, such as Gombrich or Paul Griffiths,
have supported or extended La Vallée Poussin’s conclusions; other
scholars like Gómez have disagreed, but still affirmed the value of
investigating these issues.3 I offer this essay as a contribution to
this ongoing conversation.4

1

2

On this distinction between monks of the forest and those of the town, see, for
instance, Strong 2015: 210-212. The terms given in parentheses here are
used by Collins 1998: 37.
In lieu of providing such a list here myself, I would note that Wen 2009
includes a useful review of some prior scholarship. Though by no means
comprehensive, he helpfully classifies scholarly views into several groups,
but strangely (to my mind) lumps together all those who, he says, see calm
and insight as representing “separate” or “contradictory” soteriological
“approaches,” without really engaging their specific arguments (11-15).
After completing the final draft of this essay, I became aware of Anålayo
2018 and Wynne 2018, which contain many more references to arguments
on both sides of this debate, and bring the discussion up to a more current
period. As will be apparent, my essay discusses some of the same primary
sources the proper interpretation of which has been an issue of longstanding debate.

3

Building upon La Vallée Poussin’s earlier position, Griffiths 1981 published
an article describing concentration and insight as diametrically opposed
styles of meditation practice, one culminating in emptying the mind and the
other aiming to suffuse it with a particular vision of reality. To my mind,
this is drawing the distinction too sharply, when oftentimes the meditative
practices being prescribed entail doing both styles of practice more or less at
the same time; the cognitive tasks actually seem to support one other. See
Kaur 2016 for a recent evaluation and use of Griffiths. Not citing Griffiths,
but the earlier position of La Vallée Poussin, Gómez 1999 argues that while
śamatha and vipaśyanå may reflect different temperaments and cognitive
styles, these concepts or the practices to which they refer should nonetheless
be seen on a continuum of related styles of meditation practiced within
communities of like-minded practitioners.

4

I completed the first draft of this essay soon after Luis Gómez passed away in
early September 2017. Then I flew to Shanghai, China, and presented it at
an international workshop at Fudan University. I am grateful to the
organizers (especially Zhen Liu and Bertram Dscho) and the sponsors of the
workshop for inviting me to participate and making it possible, financially,
for me to do so. For one thing, it gave me an opportunity to be among
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In order to enter into the conversation a bit more deeply, I
want to begin by asking a couple of relatively straightforward
yes/no questions. First, is it possible for one to become an arhat (a
“liberated” being) through insight alone, that is, without achieving
any degree of meditative concentration whatsoever? The consensus
on this question, at least in the classical, mainstream Buddhist
literature, appears to be negative, despite what some scholars and
(perhaps) practitioners have, at times, suggested. It matters what
one means by insight and meditative concentration, but the
consensus seems rather to be that insight meditation (defined nontechnically), or the cultivation of insight, either includes within
itself or presupposes some degree of meditative concentration, or
that concentration and insight work together somehow. So, here is
another question: is it possible to become “liberated” through
insight meditation alone, that is, through the cultivation of wisdom
or insight through specific “meditative” practices – the cultivation
of “mindfulness” (sati/sm®ti), for example – without having
achieved certain specified levels of meditative concentration,
sometimes identified as the four “absorptions” (jhåna; dhyåna), but
more commonly the eight “liberations” (vimokkha/vimoΣkΣa),
including “the attainment of cessation” (nirodha-samåpatti)? The
consensus on this question seems more affirmative: yes, at least
some Buddhist practitioners have held this view, and many
Buddhist meditation teachers do so today, in Burma, for instance.5
This view does not necessarily conflict with the consensus position
on the previous question, however, and it may even be consistent
with (though not identical to) what the Dalai Lama suggests in the
quote cited above. It also carries certain implications: for instance,
it implies the possibility of becoming “liberated” without having
cultivated or achieved certain types of extraordinary powers.
Disagreement remains about when such an understanding
was first formulated and expressed in Buddhist texts, and whether
the earliest Buddhist scriptures imply or support it, but on a

5

colleagues and make new friends at a time when I was still mourning one of
my chief mentors in the academic life.
On these points, see Wen 2009, but also Dhammajoti 2015 for an interesting
study of classical Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma texts on this issue. The fact that
“mindfulness” has come to be classified, anachronistically (and incorrectly)
according to Gethin (2011: 273), as an exclusively “insight meditation”
practice further underlines the point.
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theoretical or practical level, if it is agreed that some degree of
meditative concentration is necessary for, or part of, the effective
practice of insight meditation (again, non-technically conceived),
then much of the debate seems to boil down to the question of how
much concentration is sufficient for the cultivation of insight to
bring about its intended effect: paradigmatically, the achievement
of awakening and complete cessation at the end of the present life.
This is a theoretical question, and maybe it is also a practical
question. It is certainly of interest to practitioners and scholars.
Such a question (or the like, e.g., how calm and insight work
together to achieve their intended effect) will undoubtedly prompt
further investigations of Buddhist doctrinal, theoretical, and
exegetical literature, and other forms of Buddhist discourse about
meditation and the path. But in lieu of new data, historical or
otherwise, or an alternative method of approaching old data, which
would enable me to articulate a new perspective on such a question,
I have sought a different way to approach the topic of the
relationship between calm and insight. Going back to some of the
open questions prompted by the investigations of La Vallée
Poussin, Griffiths, Gombrich, Gómez, and others, I have tried to
ask, more specifically, how particular Buddhist narratives depict
specific individuals who are described as either “liberated by
wisdom” or a “dry-insight practitioner,” and how particular
Buddhist narratives connect calm and insight meditation.6 Seeking
6

These questions assume both a specific taxonomy of the (textual) data and a
method of analysis, and I have clearly laid out neither here. I hope that a
sense for both will emerge over the course of the essay, but at minimum I
am assuming a definition of narrative as distinct from the paradigmatic
mode of discourse – see, e.g., Collins 1998: 121-122 – in my view, these
two modes can be seen as occupying the poles of a discursive spectrum with
dialogue somewhere in the middle. So, while La Vallée Poussin marshalled
a range of textual evidence to support his claims, and several of these texts
have served as a basis for continuing scholarly investigations, much of this
textual evidence is doctrinal, systematic, or theoretical in nature. A few
scholars, like John Strong, have drawn attention to other types of sources,
including some narrative passages that place meditation and ascetic practice
at one end of an opposition with the preservation and mastery of Buddhist
texts on the other. See, for example, the passages given in Strong 2002,
under “Divisional Issues: Practice vs. Study,” section 6.3.1, pages 223-226,
about which more will be said below. It would also be interesting to look
more closely at the genre of practice manuals. In any case, my argument
here assumes that the analysis of narratives requires a method sensitive to
the fact that narratives are the object of analysis. It is also possible to look at
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answers to these questions may enable us to bridge a divide that
has often been maintained between narrative and doctrine, and
approach the topic in a new way.
Guided by these latter questions, this essay will review a
few pertinent passages and dialogues in Påli, but its main focus
will be on two narratives, one in Påli and the other in Sanskrit,
neither of which has received much, if any, previous attention from
scholars interested in the topic. One is the story of Cakkhupåla
from the Påli Dhammapada commentary, which features a rare
example of a specific person who is actually described in the story
as a “dry-insight practitioner.” I place this story within the context
of other named individuals in other Buddhist dialogues and stories
who are described as being “liberated by wisdom,” and then
compare these examples with a second narrative, the story of
Sthavira from the Sanskrit Avadånaßataka, and also with a few
more dialogues in Påli. As we will see, this second story and these
latter examples present calm and insight as going together
somehow, perhaps even in a combined practice. The evidence from
all these dialogues and stories does not show a clear opposition
between calm and insight as distinctive forms of life or practice,
meditation or otherwise; instead, the stories either point to their
combination under a generalized notion of practice, or alternatively
suggest that the practice of “insight meditation” itself could stand
for what we might broadly call “Buddhist asceticism.” Both stories
tie a generalized notion of practice, including meditation practice,
to an overarching ascetic or monastic lifestyle, practiced
intensively and over a short period of time, and in this way, they
may also connect the discussion to another important tension that
has occupied both scholars and practitioners of Buddhism, the one
between longer (or more gradual) and quicker (or more sudden)
paths to awakening. Consequently, we begin to see that there is
more at stake in these narratives than simply providing a clear
answer to a doctrinal or practical question. For one thing, they
project meaningful worlds of human motivation and action, and
invite us, the readers or audience, to consider what it would mean
to see the narrative worlds they project as our world of lived
experience.

texts typically read as expressions of doctrine or philosophy from the
perspective that they are narratives, but that is not my primary focus here.
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The Arhat Liberated by Wisdom and the Dry-Insight
Practitioner
In a few passages from canonical Buddhist literature, we
encounter the mysterious figure of the arhat who is described as
being “liberated by wisdom” (P. paññåvimutta; Skt. Prajñåvimukta). Who is this person? What is his provenance? What is
meant by wisdom in the contexts where this figure appears? What
is meant by being liberated in these contexts? And what do these
texts tell us about the means of achieving such liberation? In the
commentaries and in some Buddhist narratives and systematic
works, we meet this figure again. He (or ostensibly she, though I
am unaware of any female persons who are specifically described
this way in Buddhist texts or stories) is sometimes identified with
another figure, the so-called “dry-insight practitioner” (P. sukkhavipassaka, from Skt. ßuΣka, meaning dried, parched, or withered).7
In the context of Buddhist literature, these two figures, the one
liberated by wisdom and the dry-insight practitioner, appear
emblematic of a certain type of special being or person. In that
sense, both terms convey a certain recognized social or institutional
status within an imagined (and possibly an actual) Buddhist
community, whatever the ontological claims of the tradition about
the reality of the states described or implied by the terms.
Now, classical Buddhist literature does not contain many
examples of specifically named individuals who are described as
either liberated by wisdom or a dry-insight practitioner, and the
latter term seems to be limited entirely to the commentarial
literature. The Sus¥ma-sutta from the Saµyutta-nikåya (and its
commentary) is probably the best-known example,8 and along with
a few other texts, this dialogue has probably received the most
attention from scholars since La Vallée Poussin’s times.9 But it is

7

8

9

By extension, the Sanskrit term can sometimes carry negative connotations in
certain contexts, where it can mean feigned, emptied, useless, or offensive.
For an English translation of this dialogue, see Bodhi 2000: 612-618. This may
be cross-referenced against the page numbering of the Pali Text Society
(PTS) edition of the original Påli. In what follows, I have generally used the
Cha††ha Sa∫gåyana (CS) edition of the Påli. Only in certain instances have I
checked it against the PTS edition.
Gombrich 1996 discusses the Påli and the Chinese versions of the dialogue,
but in my view, he seems to mischaracterize the latter; Wen 2009 includes

28

The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 20, 2019

rather bare of detail, and thus it has given rise to confusion as well
as much speculation. As we will see, it is only in the Påli
commentary and maybe also in the Chinese version that Sus¥ma is
clearly considered to be an arhat liberated by wisdom, at all, and
only the Påli commentary uses the key term, dry-insight
practitioner, in this context. However, I also know of two other
narrative exemplars, both of which have so far received less
attention from scholars. One is the story of Cakkhupåla, the
opening story of the Påli Commentary on the Dhammapada
(Dhammapada††hakathå), which as stated above features a monk
named Cakkhupåla who is explicitly described as a dry-insight
practitioner.10 The other is found in an episode from a story in the
Divyåvadåna, where a monk named P¨rˆa Kuˆ∂opadhån¥yaka is
described as being liberated by wisdom.11 As we will see, both of
these examples provide more narrative context than does the
Sus¥ma-sutta. So, analyzing them can help us to gain a fuller
picture of what the texts might have in mind when they say that
someone is liberated by wisdom or a dry-insight practitioner, thus
providing an understanding that may then be used to reconsider
better-known texts like the Sus¥ma-sutta and its commentary.
Apart from these three examples, the other occurrences in
the classical literature of the concept of being liberated by wisdom
are more abstract and theoretical. They do not concern specifically
named individuals. Rather, they are found in lists of different types
of persons and their attributes. This is true, for instance, in the
Puggalapaññatti and the K¥†ågiri-sutta.12 No specific persons are
explicitly mentioned there. This is also true for the Kosamb¥-sutta,
which features the well-known dialogue with Mus¥la and Nårada,
which provided La Vallée Poussin with the title of his famous

10

11

12

an English translation of the Chinese, which helps one to see how this might
be so.
Again, I have used the CS edition as my main source for this story, but in this
case, I have also compared it against the PTS edition in Norman 1906: 3-24;
for an English translation of the PTS edition, see Burlingame 1921: 146ff.
For the principal Sanskrit edition, see Cowell and Neil 1886; for an English
translation, see Rotman 2008. On this episode, see also Strong 1992: 141ff.
The Kī†ågiri-sutta is dialogue 70 of the Majjhima-nikåya (MN). For an
English translation, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 577-584; for the PTS
edition, see vol. 1, 473-481. For the PTS edition of the Puggalapaññati, see
Morris 1883; and for an English translation, see Law 1924.
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essay.13 As Gómez (1999) has pointed out, neither the Chinese nor
the Påli portrays Mus¥la as unambiguously claiming to be an arhat
in the first place, much less one liberated by wisdom or the like; so
for the remainder of this section, I want to return briefly to the
Sus¥ma-sutta, which occurs in very close proximity to the
Kosamb¥-sutta in the Påli Buddhist canonical discourses, and use it
to establish a working framework for thinking about the other two
narrative examples, which I will discuss in the next section.
As the dialogue opens, an ascetic named Sus¥ma decides to
become ordained as a Buddhist monk, because he witnesses the
material support the Buddha’s monks have been receiving from the
lay community. After becoming a Buddhist monk, Sus¥ma hears
about a number of monks who assert that they are arhats. He is
curious and goes to speak with them, and he asks them whether
they also possess five types of “extraordinary knowledge and
powers” (abhiññå), including “superhuman powers” (iddhi) and so
forth. In each case, they say they do not. Then Sus¥ma asks them
whether they “have known and seen those calm liberations that
transcend material form and are immaterial, or have touched them
with the body” (janantå evaµ passantå ye te santå vimokkhå
atikkamma r¨pe åruppå te kåyena phusitvå viharatha). Again, they
say they have not. Sus¥ma doesn’t understand how one could be an
arhat and not possess these qualities or powers. The monks then
explain that they are “liberated by wisdom” (paññåvimutta).
Sus¥ma still doesn’t understand what they are saying, and
so he goes to see the Buddha and conveys the entire conversation
to him. The Buddha then explains: “Sus¥ma, at first there is
knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma (dhamma††hitiñåˆa),14
and afterwards there is knowledge of cessation.” Since the
Buddha’s explanation here is quite terse and unclear, the discourse
seems to want to explain what he means with an analogy. The
Buddha likens Sus¥ma’s own understanding of basic principles of
the Dhamma to that of the monks “liberated by wisdom,” but it is
unclear, at least from the Påli version, that Sus¥ma actually is an
arhat at this point. In fact, this never becomes clear in the Påli
13

14

For an English translation of this short dialogue, see Bodhi 2000, 609-611; it
is found in the PTS edition, vol. 2, 115-118.
See Bodhi 2000, 785, n. 211, for the commentary’s explanation of this odd
phrase.
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version, and thus the analogy between Sus¥ma and the arhats
liberated by wisdom remains uncertain. In the version found in the
Chinese ågamas, however, Sus¥ma gains a “dust-free, stainless,
purified vision of the Dhamma” as a result of his discussion with
the Buddha, and this seems to be equivalent to gaining knowledge
of the stability of the Dhamma. Then, at the end of the dialogue, the
Chinese version states very clearly that Sus¥ma becomes an arhat.
Now, it seems to me that the Sus¥ma-sutta as currently
extant in both Påli and Chinese tries to address two distinct
questions, though both of these more specific questions could be
contained within the general question: what does it mean to say
that someone is liberated by wisdom? One of the more specific
questions relates to the qualities or powers that an arhat liberated
by wisdom possesses, or rather does not possess: in short, what
does an arhat liberated by wisdom know or do? The second distinct,
more specific question addressed in the discourse concerns how
one becomes liberated by wisdom. In response to this second
question, the discourse suggests stages or some sort of process
whereby becoming established or stabilized in one’s knowledge of
the Dhamma leads to liberation, but it may also suggest that
engaging in a dialogue with the Buddha can itself be liberating.
As it stands in the extant Påli and Chinese texts of the
Sus¥ma-sutta, the different answers to these two questions sit
uneasily together, though the Chinese version tries to smooth over
the transitions and close the gaps in the narrative. So, too, do the
Påli commentaries, which explicitly draw the parallel between
Sus¥ma and the arhats liberated by wisdom, and also make the
explicit connection between the arhat liberated by wisdom and the
dry-insight practitioner. Consider the following passage from the
Påli commentary:
For what reason does he [the Buddha] begin by saying “And
do you, also, Sus¥ma…”? The purpose is to make clear that
the monks are dry-insight practitioners (sukkhavipassaka)
who have not achieved absorption (nijjhånaka). Indeed, this
is the intention here: “It isn’t that you [Sus¥ma], solely, are a
dry-insight practitioner who has not achieved absorption.
These monks are the same, too.”15

15

Following the CS edition: Api pana tvaµ susīmåti idaµ kasmå årabhi?
Nijjhånakånaµ
sukkhavipassakabhikkh¨naµ
påka†akaraˆatthaµ.
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So, it looks like an attempt is being made here in the commentary
to establish a series of connections that are not at all made clear in
the extant text, either in the Påli or the Chinese version. For one
thing, the commentary attempts to establish a parallel between the
unnamed monks who call themselves “liberated by wisdom,” and
Sus¥ma, who makes no such claim. It also attempts to establish an
equivalency between being liberated by wisdom and being a dryinsight practitioner, without the latter term being used in the
discourse itself.
Quite significantly, the Påli commentary also glosses the
expression “liberated by wisdom” (paññåvimutta), used in the
discourse by the unnamed monks to describe themselves, with the
following explanation: “‘Friend, we are liberated by wisdom,’
means ‘friend, we are dry-insight practitioners who have not
achieved absorption and are liberated by wisdom alone’.” 16 Also
significantly, the commentary glosses the rather opaque phrase,
“knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma,” as “knowledge
through insight (meditation)” (vipassanåñåˆa). The commentary
thus places a great deal of emphasis on the cultivation of vipassanå
as the means by which one becomes an arhat liberated by wisdom,
its practice being one of the distinguishing characteristics of this
type of person, according to the commentary.17 But while it is fairly
clear that the Sus¥ma-sutta does conceive of such a person in
general terms, and provides some general characteristics of such a
person, such as the fact that such persons have not experienced
certain states of meditative absorption and do not possess certain
extraordinary powers, it is not entirely clear that the discourse itself
names Sus¥ma as being one such specific individual, or that it
clarifies the means by which he (or anyone else) becomes one,
whatever the commentary may say.
Ayañhettha adhippåyo – na kevalaµ tvameva nijjhånako sukkhavipassako
etepi bhikkh¨ evar¨påyevåti.
16
Paññåvimuttå kho mayaµ, åvusoti, åvuso, mayaµ nijjhånakå sukkhavipassakå
paññåmatteneva vimuttåti dasseti. The italicized phrase above is an attempt
to convey the double emphasis in the original, paññåmatteneva, “precisely
(or only) through wisdom alone.”
17
The commentary maybe also indicates that vipassanå and the knowledge
arising from it belongs on a continuum of practices and types of knowledge
that arise over time, when it comments: Nibbåne ñåˆanti vipassanåya
ciˆˆante pavattamaggañåˆaµ taµ pacchå uppajjati.
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The Blind Arhat as Dry-Insight Practitioner, and a Monk who
is Liberated by Wisdom
In the previous section, I attempted to establish a basic
framework for thinking about how some Påli canonical sources
discuss the nature of the arhat liberated by wisdom, and how the
Påli commentary establishes a connection between this type of
person, the practice of insight, and the so-called dry-insight
practitioner. In particular, we saw that the Sus¥ma-sutta, which
scholars have identified as one of the key texts for establishing
these connections, is less clear than one might wish, especially for
the purposes of supporting such an important claim as
“Enlightenment can be attained without meditation, by a process of
intellectual analysis alone.” We saw that several of the basic terms,
definitions, and connections are found only in the commentary, and
even in the commentary, the practice of insight does not entail
mere intellectual analysis. With the Sus¥ma-sutta, we are
confronted with a hybrid text, one that has given rise to several
layers of exegesis, and it is difficult to pull apart the various
strands and see how they are woven together. This is where the
next story may aid us. Since it is a relatively complete narrative, it
can be treated more holistically, and it features a specific character
that the story itself describes as a dry-insight practitioner.
This narrative is also found in a commentary, but perhaps a
different level or kind of commentary: it comes from the Påli
commentary on the Dhammapada, where it features as the first
story of the collection. Over time, the commentary on the
Dhammapada became a large storehouse of Buddhist narrative
literature. The introductory verses claim that it is a translation into
Påli of a commentary in Sinhalese dialect that had been handed
down by tradition. While the precise relationship between this
commentary on the Dhammapada and the commentaries on the
four main Nikåyas remains unclear, this particular story may help
us to shed some further light on the concept of the “dry-insight
practitioner” and the type of practices that were associated with
such a person. In this way, we can learn more about what some
Buddhists may have thought it meant to “practice insight
meditation” or achieve liberation “through wisdom alone.”
The story features someone named Påla or Mahåpåla, “Big
Påla,” the eldest son of a wealthy householder in the city of
Såvatthi during the time of the Buddha. He is named Påla,
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“Protector,” because he was born only after his father built an
enclosure protecting a large tree he believed to be inhabited by a
powerful yakkha or tree spirit. The householder eventually has two
sons, whom he calls Big Påla and Little Påla. Both sons are
married, and then some time later the parents die, leaving
everything to the two sons. At this point in the story, the Buddha is
said to be residing in the Jetavana Monastery; one day, Big Påla
sees a large group of laypeople going to see the Buddha and hear
him preach the Dharma. He accompanies them, and after hearing
the Buddha’s sermon, he decides to become a monk. He seeks the
Buddha’s permission, and the Buddha requires him to ask his
younger brother first. The younger brother tries to dissuade him,
making various arguments, including one that Big Påla is still a
young man, and that he should wait and become a monk when he is
old, but Big Påla remains adamant that he will join the monastic
order immediately, and he is allowed to do so. According to the
story, he then spends nearly five years as a monk, after which point
he goes to see the Buddha.
Here the story becomes quite interesting for the present
discussion. Big Påla begins by asking the Buddha a question:
“Respected one,” he asks, “how many responsibilities (dhura) are
there in this teaching?” The Buddha responds, “Monks have only
two responsibilities, namely, the responsibility to learn the texts
(ganthadhura) and the responsibility to practice insight meditation
(vipassanådhura).” Big Påla then asks the Buddha to explain what
these two responsibilities entail. The Buddha describes the
responsibility of learning texts as follows:
In accordance with one’s own wisdom/discernment (paññå),
one learns the Word of the Buddha (buddhavacana), either
one or two nikåyas, or indeed the whole Tripi†aka, and one
holds it in mind, recites it, and teaches it.18
The Buddha then describes the responsibility for practicing insight
meditation in this way:
One lives simply; and indeed, one finds happiness in having
one’s seat and bed in a secluded location; becoming wellestablished in the viewpoint that one’s whole person is

18

Attano paññånur¨pena ekaµ vå dve vå nikåye sakalaµ vå pana
tepi†akaµbuddhavacanaµ uggaˆhitvå tassa dhåraˆaµ kathanaµ

våcananti…
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subject to decay and destruction, one dwells persistently
practicing insight meditation, and one becomes an arhat.19

Although we find here some kind of opposition or dichotomy
between textual study and meditation practice, the latter also
involving a high degree of asceticism, at the same time these two
“responsibilities” are not presented as a clear opposition between
two different paths to the same goal, nor between two different
goals or conceptions of the ultimate. Even though the responsibility
to practice insight meditation is explicitly said to lead one to
become an arhat, the ultimate goal of the responsibility to study
texts is not made clear. Ostensibly, the immediate goal is the
ability to recite and teach the Dhamma, but the precise relationship
between the two responsibilities, whether they are mutually
exclusive, how they should be balanced, who should do what,
when, and so forth: none of this is explored any further in the story.
Instead, upon hearing about these two responsibilities, Big
Påla says: “Respected one, since I have become a monk when I am
an old man, it is not possible for me to fulfill the responsibility of
learning the texts, but I can fulfill the responsibility of practicing
insight meditation. Therefore, please teach me a meditation
practice (kamma††håna).” This statement is a bit odd, since Big
Påla’s younger brother had previously argued unsuccessfully that
Big Påla wait until he was an old man to become a monk, but no
mention is made of this discrepancy. The Buddha simply gives him
what the story describes as a meditation practice that will lead him
to become an arhat, and we are left to consider Big Påla’s
motivations for choosing insight meditation practice over learning
the texts. Can it really be that he considers the practice of insight
meditation to be more doable than learning texts, or are his
motivations actually more direct and extreme in their focus?
No more specific description of the Buddha’s meditation
instructions to Big Påla is found in the story, but as it proceeds, Big
Påla gathers a group of sixty like-minded monks, and together they
search for a place to practice during the three months of the
monsoon retreat. They travel a long distance until they reach a
large town said to be in the border regions. There they develop a
19

Sallahukavuttino pana pantasenåsanåbhiratassa attabhåve khayavayaµ
pa††hapetvå
såtaccakiriyavasena
vipassanaµ
vavvhetvå
arahattaggahaˆanti…
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positive relationship with the local community, who build them a
monastery and supply them with food and other material support.
As they settle into their practice, the monks discuss their plans for
the retreat, and while the other monks decide that they will spend
time “in all four postures” (standing, sitting, walking, and lying
down), Big Påla makes a vow that he will not lie down during the
entire rains retreat. So, while the details of the meditation practice
remain vague, the story emphasizes the theme of Big Påla’s
asceticism.
Indeed, Big Påla’s perseverance and effort, his brute
asceticism, is extremely intense. His vow not to lie down results in
his eyes beginning to burn and weep. Although a local doctor treats
him for the condition, the doctor tells him he must lie down for the
treatment to work. Big Påla refuses to do this, for it would break
his vow, and the doctor eventually abandons him to his own
devices. The monk perseveres with his practices, and as a result he
loses his eyesight at the same time that he becomes an arhat. This is
apparently what earns him the rather ironic nickname, Cakkhupåla,
“Protector of the Eyes.” The doctor/patient relationship depicted in
the story would be interesting to consider further, but for our
purposes the moment he loses his eyesight and becomes an arhat is
the most significant one in the story, because here the story
explicitly describes him as a “dry-insight practitioner” (sukkhavipassaka).
It is worth emphasizing again that this is the only instance I
have found in which a specifically named individual is described
with this term within an actual story itself. Recall that it is only in
the Påli commentary that Sus¥ma is described in this way; the
Chinese translation of the discourse maybe implies that he is an
arhat liberated by wisdom, but the Påli version of the Sus¥ma-sutta
arguably ascribes this description only to a general type of person
or to a group of unnamed individuals who are contrasted with
Sus¥ma. This conclusion has for support no less an authority than
Dhammapåla himself, who says almost exactly the same thing in a
comment from the Theragåthå commentary. Writing about the dryinsight practitioner as a type of arhat, he says, “And this
classification is stated after having investigated the general nature
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of the disciples. Here, in the ‘Påli canonical texts’ (Påliya), we do
not encounter any dry-insight practitioners at all.”20
Apart from Tzungkuen Wen in his 2009 dissertation, I am
aware of no other scholar who has drawn attention to the
Cakkhupåla story in discussions of the topic of the arhat liberated
by wisdom or the dry-insight practitioner. This is surprising given
how much has been written on this topic. It is even more surprising
given that La Vallée Poussin himself is credited with co-translating
the Cakkhupåla story into French with Godefroy de Blonay in 1892.
In their translation, however, the key phrase has not been translated
for some reason. The pertinent portion reads only, “He became an
Arhat, entered into his cell, and sat down” (Il devint un Arhat,
entra dans sa cellule et s’assit).21 A possible reason for the general
neglect may be the fact that Burlingame seems to have
mistranslated the key phrase as “dwelling in the bliss of Spiritual
Insight” in his influential translation of the Dhammapada
commentary. 22 However, Wen’s careful method of searching the
Cha††ha Sa∫gåyana edition for all occurrences of the term,
20

Dhammapåla, Paramatthadīpanī, Vol. 3, p. 209: Ayañca vibhågo såvakånaµ
sådhåraˆabhåvaµ upaparikkhitvå vutto. Idha påḷiyaµ ågatå nattheva. See
also Wen 2009: 196. The Theragåthå commentary contains a parallel
version of the Cakkhupåla story, and in that telling as well, Cakkhupåla is
called a dry-insight practitioner and arhat, as Wen (2009: 195) also notes.
By påliya here, I take it that Dhammapåla means “the canonical literature,”
and thus he seems to exclude the commentaries, where we find the
Cakkhupåla story in its full form. Cakkhupåla is not described as a dryinsight practitioner in the Theragåthå itself. And it is noteworthy that
Dhammapåla does not mention Susīma here either.

21

La Vallée Poussin and Blonay 1892: 186.
Burlingame 1921, vol. 1, 152. In fact, the PTS edition of the Dhammapada
commentary reads sukhavipassaka, Norman 1906: 12, without any
indication of emendation, rather than sukkhavipassaka, which is what one
finds in the Cha††ha Sa∫gåyana edition of the Dhammapada commentary
and in the parallel story in the Theragåthå commentary in both the PTS and
CS editions. Alternatively, even if one takes the phrase here to read sudhaor maybe suddha-vipassaka, then still in that case Burlingame’s translation
would seem to be incorrect. It should then be something like “pure insight
practitioner,” carrying much the same meaning as “dry insight practitioner.”
See Wen 2009: 8, 91, 145ff, and 189 for some passages in which we find
suddhavipassaka used as an alternate term and even as alternative reading
for sukkhavipassaka, for instance, in the commentary on the Itivuttaka (189).
Both these terms are also found a few times and seemingly synonymously in
the Visuddhimagga and its commentary (Wen 2009: 145ff).
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sukkhavipassaka, uncovered this story as well. Perhaps there is
another, still more basic, reason for the neglect of this story in
modern academic discussions of insight meditation practice: the
general neglect of narrative literature in discussions of Buddhist
intellectual history, including the history of the theory of practice.
So, what does this story reveal about the commentarial
understanding of the arhat liberated by wisdom and his style of
practice? For one thing, it actually muddles the image by upsetting
whatever clean parallel we might have drawn between
concentration and insight, on the one hand, and “meditation
practice” and “the vocation of (textual) study,” on the other. In this
story, no contrast is ever explicitly found between two or more
styles of meditation, such as calm and insight. Instead, the monks
devoted to vipassanå or the kamma††håna practice would actually
seem to parallel those “practitioners of the jhånas” (jhåyin) in the
well-known Mahåcunda-sutta in the A∫guttara-nikåya, where such
“meditators” are famously contrasted with the so-called
“specialists in the Dhamma” (dhammayoga). 23 Drawing the full
parallel, however, would require that we identify the monks
responsible for learning the texts (ganthadhura) of this story with
the specialists in the Dhamma (dhammayoga) of that discourse,
and that may well be inappropriate, especially if Gómez (1999) is
correct in his understanding of the latter as itself a form of
meditation practice.
Perhaps there is actually a clearer dichotomy articulated in
the Cakkhupåla story between the vocations of textual study and
meditation practice than there is in the Mahåcunda-sutta, but while
the meditation practice is presented as efficient insofar as it does
enable Big Påla to become an arhat, his practice is not described in
any detail and it is explicitly tied to an entire ascetic lifestyle,
which Big Påla embodies and the Buddha initially describes as part
of the responsibility of practicing insight meditation. The story of
Cakkhupåla also emphasizes these ascetic practices, since only he
makes the vow not to lie down during the retreat, and only he goes
blind. The story thus distinguishes between different levels of
asceticism, and not between different types of meditation.
23

For an English translation of this discourse, see Bodhi 2012: 917-919. In the
PTS edition of the Påli, this discourse is found in vol. 3, p. 355-356. See
also Gombrich 1996, Gómez 1999, and La Vallée Poussin 1937a.
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Certain echoes of this story also indicate that it was
understood more in terms of its emphasis on asceticism than on
what we might commonly consider the practice of insight
meditation. In his well-known anthology of sources, The
Experience of Buddhism, John Strong (2002: 223-224) translates a
portion of the Paµsuk¨lånisaµsa (a Påli text he calls “late”),
which contains the key paragraph from the Dhammapada
commentary, describing the two responsibilities of the monk, but
changes other details of the narrative. Strong frames the passage
using a number of the same dichotomies we have been discussing,
primarily emphasizing the difference between textual study and
meditation practice. Returning to the same set of passages later in
Buddhisms: An Introduction, Strong points out that these two
responsibilities were not necessarily seen as mutually exclusive,
though they were sometimes in tension.24
In the Paµsuk¨lånisaµsa, the description of the vocation of
study is identical to what is found in the Dhammapada
commentary, but the vocation of meditation is described rather
differently. Initially, it is defined using some of the same terms as
the Dhammapada commentary: “A monk cultivates insight into
destruction and aging, and thereby achieves the state of an arhat.”25
However, after Kassapa, who is the Buddha’s interlocutor here,
gives a response that is the same as what Cakkhupåla says in the
Dhammapada commentary about choosing the vocation of insight
meditation because he is an old man, the Paµsuk¨lånisaµsa adds:
“Speaking about the vocation of insight, the Blessed One said,
‘Kassapa, buddhas praise the thirteen ascetic practices
(dhutå∫ga)...’,” and the text goes on to discuss the technical issue
of the monk’s robes in more detail. 26 In this way, this “late”
Buddhist text also connects the vocation of insight meditation to
the broader ascetic lifestyle.
If the concentration/insight dichotomy does not always or
necessarily parallel the dichotomy between meditation practice and
textual study, how then should we understand the figure of the
24

25

26

Strong 2015: 208-209. In this respect, he seems to rely mainly on his prior
textual evidence, but also points to other scholastic formulations.
Gisette Martini 1973: eko bhikkhu khayavayavipassanaµ vavhetvå yavå
arahattaµ patvå… (68).
Martini 1973: bhagavå vipassanådhuram kathesi « kassapa terasadhuta∫gåni
buddhå pasaµsanti… (68).
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arhat liberated by wisdom or the dry insight practitioner? Such a
figure seems most clearly defined as an arhat who has not achieved
the eight “liberations,” including the attainment of cessation, or an
arhat who does not possess the five types of extraordinary
knowledge and powers, or an arhat who does not possess some
combination of these attainments.27 This is what the Sus¥ma-sutta
says, and it is also clear from the Cakkhupåla story that the blind
arhat does not possess any extraordinary powers or attainments
besides, of course, being an arhat. While the display of superhuman
powers is not a major theme in the story, it does emphasize
Cakkhupåla’s blindness, which is not miraculously healed by the
gods or the Buddha or an act of truth; the story is about the power
of past actions to condition and impose limitations even upon the
nature and abilities of the arhat. Such attainments and abilities
would also include certain states of meditative absorption above
the realm of the material, the sensual, and the conceptual, and they
would include certain types of “mundane” knowledge and powers
that are considered somehow extraordinary or superhuman, being
some of the same types of powers and knowledge possessed by
gods, wheel-turning kings, and other divine or semi-divine beings.
This lack of superhuman powers is also the key
characteristic distinguishing the arhat liberated by wisdom in the
final narrative episode I want to discuss in this section. This
example comes from the story of P¨rˆa in the Divyåvadåna. In the
story, a layman named P¨rˆa, who lives in the city of S¨rpåraka on
the western coast of India, invites the Buddha and his community
of monks to travel there for a meal. Meanwhile the Buddha is
staying in the north in the city of Íråvast¥. He nonetheless
perceives the layman’s invitation, which takes on wondrous
proportions through the Buddha’s power, and consents to go. The
Buddha and many of the elders take meal tickets, and the Buddha
tells Ónanda to inform the other monks that whoever else wishes to
go for the meal should take a meal ticket.
Ónanda goes to the assembly, makes the announcement,
and begins to hand out meal tickets. There is another monk in
attendance, also named P¨rˆa or the One Who Uses His Water Pot
for a Pillow (Kuˆvopadhån¥yaka); he also wishes to go, and
27

This statement also accords with the most recent findings of Wen 2009 and
Dhammajoti 2015 with respect to the Sarvåstivåda canonical and scholastic
materials preserved in Chinese.
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reaches for a meal ticket. However, P¨rˆa or “Little P¨®na”
(P¨rˆaka), as he is called in the story, is said to be “liberated by
wisdom” (prajñåvimukta). So, when he reaches for a meal ticket,
Ónanda says to him in verse:
Venerable one, this is not an invitation to eat in the home of
the King of Koßala;
Nor in the palace of Sudatta [i.e., Anathåpiˆvika]; nor in the
mansion of M®gåra.
The city of S¨rpåraka is more than a hundred leagues from
here;
One must go there with superhuman powers. So, you be
quiet, little P¨®na.28

The narrator of the story then explains: “He [P¨rˆa] was liberated
by wisdom. Therefore, he had not acquired superhuman powers (sa
prajñåvimukta˙ tena ®ddhir notpåditå).” This makes the equation
quite clear: liberation by wisdom equals no superhuman powers.
However, the matter does not the end there. P¨rˆa reflects, “Even
though I have vomited out, spit out, thrown away, and driven away
the whole mass of afflictions, I do not possess the superhuman
powers that are shared in common with the rival ascetics.” So, he
“practices vigor” (v¥ryam åsthåya) and acquires superhuman
powers so quickly that he stretches out his arm like the trunk of an
elephant and takes one before Ónanda can give a meal ticket to a
third elder. Then P¨rˆa utters the following verses:
Not by having a wonderful body, nor by learning (ßruta), nor
by virtue of using force, O Gautama; not even by using
powerful words or wishes, does one acquire the six kinds of
extraordinary knowledge and power here in this world.
Indeed, for someone like me, whose youth has truly been
crushed by old age, the six kinds of extraordinary knowledge
and power are essayed through the powers of meditation

28

Cowell and Neal 1886: Naitad bhoktavyam åyuΣman kośalådhipater gṛhe |
agåre vå sudattasya [em.; Cowell and Neal: sujåtasya; Tib: rab sbyin]
mṛgårabhavane ’thavå || sådhikaµ yojanaśataµ S¨rpårakam ita˙ puram |
ṛddhibhir yatra gantavyaµ t¨Σˆī tvaµ bhava P¨rˆaketi (44). See also
Rotman 2008: 99 and 409, n. 313.
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(dhyåna), and through the various powers of calm (ßama),
moral virtue (ß¥la), and insight meditation (vipaßyanå).29

The Buddha then praises P¨rˆa as greatest among his monks for
taking meal tickets. In the story, the whole episode forms a kind of
preface to the Buddha’s own wondrous display, whereby (in part)
he and the monks all fly to S¨rpåraka on different types of
marvelous creatures and flying vehicles. P¨rˆa’s verses also briefly
indicate how one does (and does not) acquire such extraordinary
knowledge and superhuman power. It is noteworthy that insight
meditation is listed here alongside the cultivation of calming
meditation and moral virtue as the means by which one does
acquire such knowledge and powers. By the same token, the lack
of extraordinary knowledge and superhuman power is what
distinguishes P¨rˆa as one liberated by wisdom from the other
elders, though the episode sheds no additional light on how one
becomes liberated by wisdom. Still, the relative ease with which
P¨rˆa develops the powers, and his explanation of the means to
achieve them, suggests that calm and insight meditation belong on
a continuum of meditative practices on the path rather than in strict
opposition as competing forms of life or practice.
The Story of Old Baby and the Pairing of Calm and Insight
Meditation
There are many passages among the Påli canonical texts in
which calm and insight meditation appear in tandem or as a pair.
Sometimes, arguably, they also appear to be in some kind of
tension. One such passage is found in the A∫guttara-nikåya; the
Buddha is speaking:
Monks, these two factors (dhamma) lead to knowledge
(vijjå). What are the two? Calm (samatha) and insight
(vipassanå). Monks, when calm is cultivated, what effect
does it have? One cultivates the mind. When the mind is
cultivated, what effect does it have? Desire vanishes. Monks,
when insight is cultivated, what effect does it have? One
cultivates wisdom. When wisdom is cultivated, what effect
29

Cowell and Neil 1886: Na vapuΣmattayå śrutena vå na balåtkåraguˆaiś ca
Gautama | prabalair api vå∫manorathai˙ Σavabhijñatvam ihådhigamyate ||
śamaśīlavipaśyanåbalair vividhair dhyånabalai˙ parīkΣitå˙ | jarayå hi
nipīvitayauvanå˙ Σavabhijñå hi bhavanti madvidhå iti || (44).
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does it have? Ignorance vanishes. Monks, a mind that is
stained by desire is not liberated, while wisdom that is
stained by ignorance is not cultivated. Therefore, monks, the
disappearance of desire is liberation of the mind, and the
disappearance of ignorance is liberation by wisdom.30

Here, we find a number of paired concepts aligned with one
another: “liberation of (or by) mind” (cetovimutti) and “liberation
by (or of) wisdom” (paññåvimutti), passion and ignorance, and
calm and insight. Gombrich connects this passage to the end of the
Mahåmålunkyaputta-sutta of the Majjhima-nikåya, wherein
Ónanda asks the Buddha to explain how some monks can be
liberated of/by mind (cetovimutta), while some other monks can be
liberated by/of wisdom (paññåvimutta). In that context, the Buddha
responds, quite tersely as Gombrich notes, that “this is due to a
difference in their faculties” (ettha kho tesåhaµ ånanda
indriyavemattataµ vadåmi). 31 Gombrich says this passage
“strongly suggests that there are two…qualitatively different
experiences of release.” 32 In the A∫guttara-nikåya passage
translated above, however, there do not appear to be two different
goals, but only one: knowledge (vijjå), which seems tantamount to
awakening, liberation, or cessation of suffering.
30

31

32

The CS edition reads: Dve me, bhikkhave, dhammå vijjåbhågiyå. Katame dve?
Samatho ca vipassanå ca. Samatho, bhikkhave, bhåvito kamattha [kimattha
(syå. kaµ.), katamattha (ka.)] manubhoti? Cittaµ bhåvīyati. Cittaµ
bhåvitaµ kamatthamanubhoti? Yo rågo so pahīyati. Vipassanå, bhikkhave,
bhåvitå kamatthamanubhoti? Paññå bhåvīyati. Paññå bhåvitå
kamatthamanubhoti? Yå avijjå så pahīyati. Rågupakkili††haµ vå, bhikkhave,
cittaµ na vimuccati, avijjupakkili††hå vå paññå bhåvīyati. Iti kho, bhikkhave,
rågavirågå cetovimutti, avijjåvirågå paññåvimuttī ti. In the PTS edition, it is
in vol. 1, p. 61. Alternative translations may be found in Bodhi 2012: 152153, and Gombrich 1996: 113.
For a translation of this discourse, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 537-551.
The relevant passage is found on page 451, and in the PTS edition is found
on vol. 1, p. 437. The proximate context for the distinction in this dialogue
is the Buddha’s discussion of the eight “liberations” (vimokkha) on the path
to the elimination of the five fetters and the achievement of nibbåna.
Gombrich 1996: 112ff. To my mind, he does not seem entirely resolved within
himself on whether these passages suggest two different paths, two different
goals, or both. He speaks of “two … qualitatively different experiences of
release” (113), and that: “The above [A∫guttara-nikåya] passage…suggests
two paths to nirvana” (114). Then later he says that it suggests that “to attain
nirvana both methods must to some extent be employed” (114).
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The passage may suggest some kind of tension between two
different methods or tools for achieving this knowledge or
liberation, based on the elimination of the two different causes of
suffering implied here, passion and ignorance, but these different
causes are not placed in opposition, at least not here. They are
combined, and again, the Påli commentary suggests a gradual path
to bring about their cessation. Speaking first about the cultivation
of mind, the commentary takes it as a much more specific claim,
which might prompt a change of translation in the original. It
glosses citta, “mind” or “thought,” as maggacitta, ostensibly “the
thought of (or maybe for) the path.” This interpretation makes
sense insofar as it is the path that eliminates desire or “craving”
(tanhå), for instance, in the context of the Buddha’s explanation of
the four noble truths in the first sermon.33 And this might make a
difference here, because one could then say that one is liberated by
the thought of the path, and not that the mind is liberated. Perhaps
then the grammar would align better with the idea of liberation by
wisdom (paññåvimutti).
The broader point here is that the commentary relies on the
concept of the path to connect the different paired concepts. When
discussing the cultivation of wisdom, it also glosses wisdom or
discernment as maggapaññå, “the wisdom of (or about or from)
the path,” and then makes the interesting claim that “the thought of
the path and the wisdom of the path are said to be two factors that
arise together” (maggacittaµ maggapaññåti dvepi sahajåtadhammåva kathitå). At the end of the commentary on this passage,
the commentator also makes the point that “in this discourse,
concentration and insight are said to be momentary and diverse”
(imasmiµ sutte nånåkkhaˆikå samådhivipassanå kathitåti). It is
unclear to me precisely what this means; maybe they arise at
different moments on the path? The commentary suggests that the
path connects calm and insight to the elimination of passion and
ignorance and to the cultivation of thought and wisdom, which then
leads to knowledge.

33

For an English translation of the version of the first sermon I have in mind, see
Bodhi 2000: 1843-1847; in the PTS edition, this is found in vol. 5, p. 420424.
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Another canonical discourse that pairs calm and insight
meditation is the Mahåvacchagotta-sutta of the Majjhima-nikåya.34
In this sutta, Vacchagotta goes to see the Buddha after practicing
for some four years as a monk. He says he has achieved all the
knowledge that he can achieve through training, and he asks for a
higher or further teaching (uttari or uttariµ dhammaµ, maybe, a
teaching about what is higher). The Buddha says, “In that case, you
should cultivate two higher (or further) factors (teachings, practices,
things, dhamma): calm and insight.”35 He says that one who has
cultivated these two higher factors will be able to penetrate
manifold states or realms (dhåtu), and then goes on to explain that
such a person will attain superhuman powers, the divine ear,
knowledge of other minds, memory of past lives, the divine eye,
and finally, the following:
To the extent that you may wish – “May I, through my own
higher or direct knowledge (sayam abhiññå) in this very
lifetime, realize, attain, and dwell in the liberation by
wisdom (paññåvimutti), the liberation by mind (cetovimutti),
which is stainless due to the destruction of the stains” – you
will be able to realize and attain precisely that for which
there is a basis.36

This last state or level of attainment is equivalent to awakening and
becoming an arhat, and the language bears certain similarities to
other descriptions of the awakened state, but for our purposes here,
I want to note the pairing of the terms “liberation of/by mind” and
the “liberation of/by wisdom.” There is no tension here between
different types of awakening or liberation; the terms are used
almost synonymously. Nor is there is any indication in this
discourse of different paths to this goal; rather, the contrast is
between training practices and a higher or further teaching,
suggesting a single, gradated process or continuum of practices,
not a dichotomy between alternatives.
34
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For an English translation, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 595-602; in the PTS
edition, it is vol. 1, p. 489ff.
Following the CS edition: tena hi tvaµ, Vaccha, dve dhamme uttari bhåvehi –
samathañca vipassanañca.
So tvaµ, Vaccha, yåvadeva åka∫khissasi – åsavånaµ khayå anåsavaµ
cetovimuttiµ paññåvimuttiµ di††heva dhamme abhiññå sacchikatvå
upasampajja vihareyyanti – tatra tatreva sakkhibhabbataµ påpuˆissasi, sati
satiåyatane ti.
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And in another discourse from the Majjhima-nikåya, the
Mahåvedalla-sutta, calm and insight meditation are listed together
in a five-fold set of factors connected to the cultivation of right
view. 37 The question arises: “how many conditions give rise to
right view?” The answer is that there are two conditions: the voice
of another (parato ghosa) and focused attention (yoniso
manasikåra). The next question concerns how many conditions
support right view in bringing about the liberation of/by mind and
the liberation by/of wisdom. The answer given is that there are five
conditions: moral virtue (s¥la), learning (suta), dialogue (såkaccha),
calm (samatha), and insight (vipassanå). In this way, the
cultivation of calm and insight meditation are again placed on a
continuum of practices alongside the cultivation of moral habits,
learning, and dialogue, and with listening to the words of the
teacher and focused attention as the basis. Here, right view is not
the goal, but the basis for achieving liberation of/by mind and
liberation by/of wisdom.
One could cite other similar passages, but I want to turn
instead to a narrative in which calm and insight meditation are
presented together as a combined or complementary set of
practices. It is the story of Sthavira or Sthaviraka, whom I call Old
Baby. Structurally and thematically, it is quite similar to the
Cakkhupåla story, though it comes from a different Buddhist
textual tradition: the narrative tradition represented by the Avadånaßataka, The Hundred Buddhist Tales, a collection of stories that
may bear a close relationship to the M¨lasarvåstivåda-vinaya and
the Divyåvadåna, and which has been linked by various scholars to
the Sarvåstivåda tradition.38 Like Cakkhupåla, Sthavira becomes an
arhat while overcoming or experiencing the effects of both negative
and positive actions committed in prior lifetimes. As in the
Cakkhupåla story, the story of Sthavira includes a narrative of the
past in which the Buddha explains the past actions that led to the
specific circumstances of Sthavira’s final lifetime. Both stories also
feature old men who become monks and practice intensively over
the course of a rainy season retreat before finally becoming arhats.
37

38

For an English translation, see Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 390. In the PTS
edition, it is vol. 1, p. 294.
The Sanskrit edition of this text is found in Speyer 1902-1909, vol. 2, part 2:
133-146. On the intertextual relationships and school affiliation, see, for
instance, Hartmann 1985.
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In a number of respects, the story of Sthavira is a strange
tale, and since it is not yet readily available in translation, apart
from the old French translation in Feer (1891), I want to give a
sense for the whole story. It opens with the common motif of a
wealthy merchant, who marries a suitable woman, and they
conceive a child, but the story then quickly enters the realm of the
uncanny when the couple’s first child stays in his mother’s belly
for sixty years. Meanwhile, the woman gives birth to ten sons.
Eventually she becomes ill, and on her deathbed she informs her
husband that she is still carrying their first child in her belly. She
asks him to remove the boy when she dies. After the woman dies,
J¥vaka, the king of physicians, is summoned to the cremation
ground to cut open the dead woman’s belly and take out the child.
A voice from the heavens is also heard in town, announcing what is
going to happen, and people become curious. Many of them gather
at the cremation ground; the six rival teachers also join the crowd,
and the Buddha invites his monks to come and witness the event as
well, saying, “If any of you wants to see strange and unprecedented
events, come with me” (yo ’dbhutåni draΣ†ukåµa˙ sa ågacchatu).
When the Buddha arrives with his entourage of monks, the crowd
makes way for them.
Once everyone has arrived, J¥vaka cuts open the dead
woman’s belly, and out steps a small, withered old man, about
sixty years old, who immediately announces to the crowd:
Honored Ones, do not speak harsh words about your gurus
or those who act on behalf of your gurus, or about your
mothers and fathers, or about your teachers and preceptors.
Do not experience a similar kind of situation to me:
remaining for sixty years amidst the stomach and
intestines.39

After saying these words, he falls silent, at which point the Buddha
engages him in a brief dialogue playing on the word, sthavira,
which means “old man,” but also “distinguished elder” or “senior
monk.” In their dialogue, the Buddha seems to acknowledge the
old boy’s status and that this will be his final lifetime: “Young man,
you are an old man, an elder” (sthavirako ’si dåraka), he says; and
39

Speyer 1902-1909, 135: må bhavanto guruΣu garusthånīyeΣu
måtåpitṛΣvåcåryopadhyåyeΣu kharåµ våcaµ niścårayata må haivaµvidhåm
avasthåm anubhaviΣyatha | yad aham åmåśayapakvåśayayor madhye ΣaΣ†i
varΣåˆyuΣita˙.
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the old boy responds accordingly, “Yes, I am an old man
(sthavirako ’ham).” This is said to be the origin of the protagonist’s
name, an element many stories in the Avadånaßataka seek to
explain, and another narrative feature the story shares with the
Cakkhupåla story.
After his conversation with Sthavira, the Buddha gives
everyone a sermon, and while many people are greatly edified by it,
Sthavira attains no great achievement from it. Apparently he must
develop more slowly. He lives for ten more years as a householder
before finally becoming a monk. When he does so at the age of
seventy, he spends the rainy season retreat in a group of twentyfive monks. The community’s elder monk, not the same person as
Sthavira, urges everyone to achieve the noble path by the end of
the retreat: “Let none of you go on practicing this path as a
common
ordinary
being”
(na
kenacit
p®thagjanena
pracårayitavyaµ), he says. They all practice intensively, and by the
end of the retreat, all of them have become arhats; only Sthavira
remains an ordinary person.
So, the elder admonishes him and expels him from the
community of practitioners. At this point, the story becomes quite
poignant. Sthavira takes a knife and goes into his hut, intending to
end his own life. There, he composes a series of quite beautiful
verses expressing his world-weariness and despair through a series
of nature images, such as the following:
The entire forest is alight; the hill has become reddish gold.
Yet even today this wretched mind is not freed.
The sound of the mountain stream has gone quiet;
The flowing waters have become a trickle;
Yet even today this wretched mind is not freed.40

The Buddha, of course, perceives Sthavira’s distress from afar, and
immediately fixes his attention upon the old monk. He uses his
superhuman powers to go and see him, and gives him another

40

Speyer 1902-1909, 136-137: ådīptaµ kånanaµ sarvaµ parvatå˙ kapilīkṛtå |
athedaµ påpakaµ cittamadyapi na vimucyate || śåntå girinadīśabdå˙
parīttasalilodakå˙ | athedaµ påpakaµ cittamadyapi na vimucyate. The
reading of parvatå˙ kapilīkṛtå in the second pada of the first verse was
suggested by F. W. Thomas, based on the Tibetan, and given Speyer’s
approval in a note in the addenda for which see page cxii of the preface.
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teaching on the Dharma of such a kind that, when Sthavira hears
it, he immediately realizes the state of an arhat.
When he becomes an arhat, Sthavira then surveys the world
with his divine eye, looking for others he can train in the Dharma,
an act that clearly mirrors the Buddha’s own enlightened behavior.
Sthavira perceives a group of five hundred merchants who are
beset by a strong hurricane. With his superhuman powers, he goes
and saves them. The merchants thereby gain faith in him and
decide to become his followers. Sthavira then gives them, the story
appears to say, a teaching on mental concentration or focused
attention (manasikåra), and after a short while, all of them become
arhats as well.
Here is the point at which the story first mentions calm
(ßamatha) and insight meditation (vipaßyanå). The group of six
monks begins to question whether Sthavira and his five hundred
followers really are arhats. It is apparent why this might be so. The
monks are disconnected from the larger community and no one has
yet tested their virtues. So, Ónanda goes to interview Sthavira and
his five hundred followers in order to test their understanding. He
first asks Sthavira: “Upon what things should a monk who has
gone to live in the forest, at the foot of a tree, or in an empty
village, maintain constant mental concentration (katame
dharmåbh¥kΣˆaµ manasikartavyå˙)?”
Sthavira readily answers, “A monk who has gone to live in
the forest, at the foot of a tree, or in an empty village, should
maintain constant mental concentration on two things: calm
(ßamatha) and insight (vipaßyanå).” Ónanda then asks about the
benefits of the persistent practice of calm and insight meditation,
respectively: “When one has persistently practiced calm, cultivated
calm, and frequently attained calm, what benefit will one
experience? When one has persistently practiced insight, cultivated
insight, and frequently attained insight, what benefit will one
experience?” Sthavira answers,
When one has persistently practiced calm, cultivated calm,
and frequently attained calm, then, achieving insight, one is
freed. When one has persistently practiced insight, cultivated
insight, and frequently attained insight, then, achieving calm,
one is freed. Venerable Ónanda, when a noble disciple has
learned and become completely saturated with calm and
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insight, then his mind is freed with regard to his mental
disposition.41

Here, Sthavira’s answer suggests that calm and insight work
together to generate the practitioner’s freedom of mind.
Grammatically, the passage conveys this point with the use of
parallel gerund constructions: When one has persistently practiced
ßamatha, then, on account of (or having mastered) insight
(vipaßyanåm ågamya), one is freed; when one has persistently
practiced insight, then, on account of (or having mastered) calm
(ßamatham ågamya), one is freed. Not only that, calm and insight
are presented here as being on the same level; one is not more or
less important than the other; they work together.
Ónanda goes on to inquire about the nature of mental
disposition in this context, and Sthavira tells him that the mental
disposition in question refers to annihilation, dispassion, and
cessation (nirodha), each of them specifically regarding the latent
tendencies or conditioning factors of existence (saµskåra). So, to
synthesize Sthavira’s message, one might say that the state of
mental freedom, which is generated through the combined practice
of calm and insight meditation, entails the understanding that
whatever arises through conditioning factors will be annihilated,
the cultivation of dispassion toward whatever arises through
conditioning factors, and ultimately the cessation of whatever
arises through conditioning factors. This would seem to be the
extent of Sthavira’s teaching on mental concentration.
Ónanda is satisfied with Sthavira’s answers, and he
proceeds to interview the five hundred followers. He asks the same
questions and receives precisely the same answers. He finally
returns to see the Buddha, and he asks him the same questions and
again receives the same answers. Ónanda then expresses his
wonderment at the fact that he has independently received the very
same answers to his questions from both Sthavira and his five
hundred followers, as well as from the Buddha himself. The
Buddha then asks him what he has determined about the situation,
and Ónanda confirms that Sthavira and his five hundred followers
41

Speyer 1902-1909, 140: śamatha åyuΣmann ånanda åsevito bhåvito
bahulīkṛto vipaśyanåm ågamya vimucyate; vipaśyanå åsevitå bhåvitå
bahulīkṛtå śamatham ågamya vimucyate (vimucyante?). Íamathavipaśyanåparibhåvitam åyuΣmann ånanda śrutavata åryaśråvakasya cittaµ dhåtuśo
vimucyate.
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are arhats. In this way, the story tells us, the Buddha and Ónanda
are able to demonstrate the virtues of Sthavira and his five hundred
followers in the face of the skepticism voiced by a group of monks.
At this point, the monks who have been listening to the
story, and who serve as the model for its ideal audience, ask what
prior actions Sthavira performed in his past lives to have stayed for
sixty years in his mother’s belly, and which led him to develop so
slowly, so very slowly, in his final lifetime, while at the same time
achieving the state of an arhat. The Buddha explains that Sthavira
had been a junior monk in a past life, during the time of the past
Buddha Kaßyapa, and out of greediness for food, he had committed
a harsh speech act toward his teacher, who was an arhat. Yet,
through recitation and study, he also achieved mastery of the
Buddha’s teachings on the five aggregates, the twelve-fold chain of
dependent arising, and the nature of the possible and the impossible.
This caused him to become a monk again in his final lifetime, and
by annihilating all the afflictions, he achieved the state of an arhat.
Within the present context, we may note the story’s
emphasis on recitation, study, and insight through hearing the
teachings, despite the fact that the content of the main teaching
concerns the pairing of calm and insight meditation practice. The
past-life story emphasizes this point, and it also can be seen in the
way the story underlines the legitimacy of Sthavira’s attainment
through a test of his understanding of what might be considered a
doctrinal point, but also a point of theory and practice. In this case,
the fact that the students repeat the same answers as Sthavira and
the Buddha then answers in the same way serves to demonstrate
that Sthavira and his students are “learned” (ßrutavat). This is a
legitimating technique of a particular kind, and a similar instance
of this same technique is found in a passage in the Påli Saµyuttanikåya in which Vacchagotta responds with wonderment to the fact
that he independently receives the same answer to his questions
from both Moggallåna the Great and the Buddha.42 In the case of
the Sthavira story, the efficacy of the teaching is further indicated
by the fact that the Buddha’s sermon is what finally facilitates
42

For an English translation of the whole passage, see Bodhi 2000: 1390-1392.
My appreciation goes to Eviatar Shulman for his presentation at the
workshop, which drew my attention to this passage and its rhetorical device.
I also understand it to be found in many other contexts in the Påli texts, as
well.
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Sthavira’s awakening. Sthavira clearly possesses superhuman
powers and extraordinary knowledge, and thus he cannot be
described as “liberated by wisdom” in the same sense we find
elsewhere, as someone lacking these sorts of powers and
knowledge. Yet, maybe to a greater degree even than the story of
Cakkhupåla, the story of Sthavira demonstrates the power and
efficacy of wisdom or insight at certain key points along a gradual
path of development with many highs and lows along the way. At
the same time, the specific doctrinal understanding, or more
accurately, the actual exhibition or demonstration of insight in the
story, the doctrinal content of which centers specifically on the
combination of calm and insight, also reflects and serves to
legitimate a particular practitioner’s level of attainment.
Concluding Thoughts
The essay began by raising a set of broad, long-standing,
and intractable questions in Buddhist Studies concerning the
relationship between calm and insight meditation, an issue that has
various doctrinal, conceptual, theoretical, practical, and historical
dimensions. Rather than engaging directly with these questions,
however, I proposed to address a slightly different set of questions,
focused on the following: What narratives feature characters who
are specifically described as being either “liberated by wisdom” or
a “dry-insight practitioner”? What can these narratives tell us about
how some ancient Buddhists conceived the relationship between
calm and insight meditation? How are teachings about the
relationship between calm and insight meditation portrayed or
conveyed in specific narrative contexts? And how does the
teaching in such narrative contexts compare to other teachings on
the relationship between calm and insight found in other Buddhist
dialogues? We explored these questions mainly by focusing on two
stories, one in Påli and the other in Sanskrit, supplemented by a
few other narratives and dialogues, some quite well-known, like
the Sus¥ma-sutta. Now in the conclusion we may consider briefly
what these narratives and dialogues can reveal about some of the
intractable questions.
One of the questions is whether the mysterious figure of the
arhat “liberated by wisdom” or the so-called “dry-insight
practitioner” justifies the historical argument made by scholars like
La Vallée Poussin, Gombrich, and others that some Buddhists have
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claimed that one can achieve awakening without any meditative
insight whatsoever, but only through the study of Buddhist texts or
some other kind of theoretical or intellectual insight into the truth.
The narrative evidence considered here does not support this claim,
at least not straightforwardly. Instead, the picture of the dry-insight
practitioner and his practice that we receive from the story of
Cakkhupåla in the Dhammapada commentary is very far, indeed,
from the one we sometimes find in the modern scholarship on this
topic, where the dry-insight practitioner is described as someone
who possesses “a sterile and desiccated intellectuality”. 43 In this
story at least, the responsibility or vocation for practicing insight
meditation appears to encompass or represent an entire ascetic
lifestyle; it does not seem to be code for some sort of intellectualist
approach to awakening. Asceticism, not intellectualism, more aptly
characterizes Cakkhupåla’s practice, which also appears to include
some kind of meditation. Thus, one conclusion to be drawn from
the present analysis is cautionary: we need to be careful about
distinguishing descriptions of particular meditative states or
categories of soteriological achievement from descriptions of
specific techniques by which such states may be achieved.
Speaking of such techniques, perhaps the idea of “liberation
through wisdom” was sometimes meant to describe certain
narrative contexts in which a dialogue with the Buddha could itself
be liberating,44 but what of the contrast between textual study and
meditation practice? While the story of Cakkhupåla does contrast
meditation practice, broadly construed, with a vocation dedicated
to the mastery of Buddhist texts, it does so, arguably, not to
suggest opposing approaches to the path or competing conceptions
of the goal. It does not tell us how the two responsibilities of the
Buddhist monk are meant to connect to one other. Rather, the
dichotomy between textual study and insight meditation provides a
narrative framework for contextualizing the overarching ascetic
lifestyle that Cakkhupåla chooses. With respect to choice of
lifestyle, the Cakkhupåla story is actually quite similar to the story
of Sthavira in the Avadånaßataka. Both stories feature monks who
enter the monastic order late in life, and they both become arhats at
43
44

This description is found in Griffiths 1981: 608.
In this regard, it may be fruitful to consider these examples in light of
Masefield (1986), which provides a larger framework for thinking about
episodes in which hearing a sermon from the Buddha is efficacious.
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the end of relatively short periods of intensive practice. They
undertake their ascetic practices (including meditation) in the
“border regions,” conceived as the ideal site for such practice. They
both concentrate on their practice during the rainy season retreat,
again, the ideal timeframe for such practices. So, the monks’ ages
and the duration and intensity of their practices dovetail with their
choice of an ascetic lifestyle and an explicit focus on achieving
awakening in their present lifetime.
In other ways, however, Cakkhupåla does share certain
characteristics seemingly associated with the arhat liberated by
wisdom. In the Sus¥ma-sutta and in the story of P¨rˆa from the
Divyåvadåna, the arhat liberated by wisdom is someone who has
achieved awakening, but not certain specific types of extraordinary
knowledge or powers. In the case of the latter, P¨rˆa develops such
powers at a moment’s notice through an intense application of
vigor, but the initial depiction of him still supports the
characterization of the arhat liberated by wisdom as someone who
does not possess certain types of extraordinary knowledge and
powers. While the development of superhuman powers are not
really made an explicit focus or theme in the story of Cakkhupåla,
it is key to the plot that he becomes blind and that his powers thus
remain limited, even after he becomes an arhat. He becomes an
arhat still, and his knowledge of the young monk’s moral character
and behavior indicates this fact, but he nonetheless remains limited
or constrained, particularly by the power of his past actions, which
condition his present-life circumstances, choices, and achievements.
Nevertheless, the point to emphasize here is that the stories do
seem to say something about the qualities or powers (or the lack
thereof) possessed by the arhat who is described as being either
liberated by wisdom or a dry-insight practitioner.
Even though the story of Cakkhupåla does contain a
dichotomy between the vocation of textual study and the vocation
of meditation, however, it does not align this dichotomy with the
one between calm and insight. By the same token, the story of
Sthavira does not present its teaching about the connection between
calm and insight as an alternative to some other teaching in which
they are differentiated or opposed, or associated with differing or
opposing lifestyles or practices. Sthavira is not called an arhat
liberated by wisdom; neither is he called a dry-insight practitioner,
nor is there any contrast presented in the story between meditation
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or ascetic practice and textual study. Instead, specific doctrinal or
propositional insights appear to reflect and legitimize specific
achievements in practice. Despite the content of its teaching about
the interdependence of calm and insight, the story arguably
contains more on the transformative potential of learning or
receiving the teachings than it does on the efficacy of intensive
meditation practice. The demonstration of a point of doctrine
becomes the measure of Sthavira’s attainment, and the past-life
portion of the story confirms the positive impact of past study and
recitation of texts. Like Cakkhupåla, however, Sthavira is both
constrained and enabled by the power of his past actions, which
partly leads to his achievement of extraordinary knowledge and
superhuman powers. This thematic similarity between the two
stories is built into their basic narrative structures, and thus it calls
for a specifically narrative analysis; but again, the point to
recognize here is that the stories actually muddle the picture by
challenging the clean parallels that have been proposed between
calm and insight, on the one hand, and meditation practice and
textual study, on the other.
Consequently, I remain doubtful that either of these stories
makes a general claim about the relative or combined value of
calm or insight in the context of some larger doctrinal discussion.
They are not clear statements of systematic Buddhist doctrine.
Instead, they are stories, and as stories, they speak to us in a
narrative mode that is quite distinct from the more paradigmatic
mode of the systematic treatises and many of the dialogues. For
this reason, the stories allow us to think in a different way about
categories like the arhat who is liberated by wisdom or the dryinsight practitioner, or “doctrinal” statements about the relationship
between calm and insight meditation. They become characters and
teachings (or practices) in a story, rather than decontextualized sets
of propositions to be deduced and understood. Now, at the same
time, there has also been a tendency to read these old stories as
historical accounts of one kind or another. Certainly, as Hayden
White (1987) observed, history is often articulated in the narrative
mode, but as Steven Collins (2013: 57) has noted, “In any place and
time it is difficult clearly to delineate when a narrative text is a
‘history’ or a ‘story’.”45 Thus, we must exercise caution before we
45

Abbott 2008 calls the distinction between “fiction” and “nonfiction” one that
is made “top-down,” whereas the distinction between “narrative” and “non-
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find evidence in these stories for our histories of Buddhism,
complete with larger master narratives governed by dichotomies of
our own making, because the stories do not provide us with
straightforward historical information either. They reflect lived
worlds of nature and social norms and institutions, but these
remain imagined and ideal worlds. The stories create these worlds
within and through the narrative, and they prompt the reader to
understand them as the real world, our world, which we can then
imagine as a world of meaning and meaningful action, but also one
(like ours) containing certain ambiguities and tensions.
So, on the intractable questions concerning the relationship
between calm and insight, we are still at the stage of collecting
relevant data, and this essay has added a couple of new data points
to the conversation. As we take stock of what we have learned,
several points can be made. First, we should become more
sensitive to the way texts sometimes slide from claims about
particular states of being or attainment, to claims about certain
types of person and their qualities, to claims about how people can
achieve such states or qualities. We should also try to separate
doctrinal, theoretical, exegetical, or pedagogical claims made in or
about specific Buddhist works from historical claims concerning
specific times and places. And we also need to disambiguate a
number of different oppositions or dichotomies that have
sometimes been conflated. For instance, calm and insight are not
the same as meditation and textual study, or practice and theory. At
the same time, since textual knowledge is also a type of practice,
we should be careful about unreflectively projecting our own
dichotomies about practice and theory onto Buddhism. Again, it
matters what one means by calm, insight, meditation, and
liberation; we need to revisit these terms and their relationships
from fresh perspectives. In a variegated tradition, ambiguities and
tensions will always give rise to outliers and alternative viewpoints,
but I think we might reasonably move forward with the hypothesis
that calm and insight (and perhaps even meditation practice and
narrative” is a “bottom-up” determination (148). In general, Abbott’s work
is a valuable resource for those who might wish to think more about the
techniques and implications of a narrative approach to Buddhist literature,
although both nonwestern literary traditions and religious narratives in
general are woefully under-represented in his discussion. For a
philosophical take on the question of religious narratives and their truthvalue, see Comstock 1993.
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textual study) are more typically seen along a continuum of related
practices of self-transformation, rather than in opposition as
competing forms of life or practice.46
Even still, I mean for this general claim to apply most
especially within the multivocal and pluralistic world of the
Buddhist textual imagination, the one constructed by and reflected
in the textual works Buddhists themselves produced. Whether and
how the stories of Cakkhupåla and Sthavira reflect specific
historical realities or clear doctrinal stances are questions that will
remain open for debate. Each narrative deserves its own close
reading, but as we have seen, oftentimes under scrutiny the
meaning of the story begins to wriggle and slip through our grasp,
defying the attempt to pin down some type of general interpretation
46

See also Fiordalis 2018, where I’ve proposed a similar hypothesis, but rather
than narratives, there I look at a rather different type of Buddhist text: the
systematic work, instantiated principally by the AbhidharmakośabhåΣya.
Whether it concerns the three practices of wisdom (learning, reasoning, and
cultivation), which provide the focus for that paper, or the pairing of calm
and insight, which has been our main focus here, the idea of seeing such
practices on a continuum does not necessarily militate against the
establishment of possible hierarchies between or among them. In this regard,
it might be useful to reconsider Louis Dumont’s famous, but also
controversial, concept of “hierarchical opposition,” which he used to
describe the structure of the Indian caste system, and which he contrasted
with the concept of binary, or what he called “complementary,” opposition.
On Dumont’s notion of hierarchical opposition and its reception, see Hage,
Harary, and Milicic 1995.
In the present context, the concepts of the arhat liberated by wisdom
and the dry-insight practitioner are sometimes deployed in contexts that
might be taken to convey a sense of hierarchy. For instance, according to the
story of the first council found in the introductory section of the Påli
commentary on the Dīgha-nikåya, Buddhaghosa indicates that Mahåkåssapa
excluded an anonymous group of dry-insight practitioners from the first
council or seated them at the outer fringes of the council alongside
anonymous groups of stream-winners, once-returners, and non-returners,
and other types of person. For the whole passage, see Rhys Davids and
Carpenter 1886: 4. My appreciation goes to Anthony Scott for reminding
me of this passage and encouraging my thinking in this regard. One might
compare this example with the relative place of arhats liberated by wisdom
in the lists of types of person cited in note 12 above. It would be interesting
to consider on a case-by-case basis the question of whether hierarchy or the
lack of hierarchy is suggested by various other narrative contexts. The
passage described above is also mentioned in Wen 2009: 171-172; he
connects it and a few other passages in the commentaries to issues related to
the gradual disappearance of the Buddha’s dispensation from the world.
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or comparison, either historical or doctrinal. Perhaps that is part of
their point – as stories, they can explore ambiguities and tensions
without necessarily resolving them – but as a final remark it
remains noteworthy that both stories are set within an imagined
world of what we might wish to call Buddhist asceticism. The
narratives locate Buddhist practices of calm and insight firmly
within this world. Expected and certainly idealized, this world
consists of communities of practitioners and seemingly reflects
their concerns. This may be an obvious point, but I think it bears
emphasizing, because it points to the narrative context for what
may be a connected theme: the stories reflect the tension
sometimes apparent in Buddhist literature between a longer path of
spiritual development and the possibility of quicker or more
dramatic periods of change or attainment. Both stories place these
quicker, more intensive paths within a much longer narrative
framework of meaningful actions and their effects across many
lifetimes. Indeed, in this respect, both stories are quite typical of
many other Buddhist narratives insofar as they illustrate the power
of past actions to condition present circumstances. Consequently,
they are exemplary tales that tell us that our own actions are
meaningful, and they also suggest that the Buddhist path in all its
variety and diversity is an effective means of finding our own
fulfillment. Therein lies the power of narrative.
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